

A  
DIALOGUE

BETWEEN A  
GENTLEMAN of *LONDON*,

Agent for two Court Candidates,

AND AN

HONEST ALDERMAN

Of the Country Party.

WHEREIN

The GRIEVANCES under which the  
Nation at present *groans* are fairly and  
impartially laid open and considered.

Earnestly address'd to the

ELECTORS of GREAT-BRITAIN.



LONDON:

Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-noster-*  
*Row*. 1747.

# DIALOGUE

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GENTLEMEN

HONESTY AND TRUTH

THE ADVANCES

Editors of Great Britain

LONDON

Printed for M. Cooper, at the Lion in Paternoster Row, 1747

1538  
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A  
**DIALOGUE**

BETWEEN

A Gentleman from *London*

AND

An ELECTOR in the COUNTRY.

Gentleman.

**M**R. Alderman, your most humble  
Servant. This Prevention of my  
Visit is kind indeed.

Alderman.

My dear Friend, I no sooner heard you  
was in Town, than I ran to embrace you.  
Our long Acquaintance and Friendship  
ought not to be satisfied with cold Compli-

B

ments;

ments; and to say Truth, I should have been better pleased if you had laid aside all Ceremony, and made my House your own.

Gentleman.

It was not, I assure you, that I doubted a hearty Welcome; but the Occasion of my coming I feared might make such a Visit less agreeable.

Alderman.

I am sorry my old Friend should come hither on any Occasion, which he imagines would be disagreeable to me.

Gentleman.

Nay, now you misunderstand me. I mean my Business here is of such a Nature, and will be attended with so many Followers, that I must have been too troublesome a Guest at a private House.

Alderman.

Nay, nay, lay aside the Courtier, tho' you have a Place, and speak out fairly.

Gentleman.

Sit thee down then, my Friend, and fill thy Pipe, and I will speak fairly and openly. I am come hither to espouse the Interest

terest of two worthy Gentlemen, at the next Election, Sir *John Protestant*, and Mr. *English*; they are strictly united, and I hope will succeed.

Alderman.

I must tell you then as plainly, I hope they will not; and I am sorry to find that one who hath always professed those honest Principles which I have heard so often from your Mouth, can espouse such a Cause.

Gentleman.

Why, do you know either of the Gentlemen, against whom you are so violent?

Alderman.

I know they are both Placemen, and that is with me a sufficient Objection to them.

Gentleman.

Sure, my Friend, this is a very dangerous Doctrine. If the Service of the Public be so inconsistent with a Man's maintaining a good Character in his Country, I am afraid it will follow either that there must be an End of Civil and all Military Offices, and consequently of all Government; or that these must be entrusted to the most vile and infamous Hands.

Alderman.

You cannot so mistake my Meaning. I would only exclude *such* from the House of Commons.

Gentleman.

Would you exclude them universally?

Alderman.

Ay, universally.

Gentleman.

We must have then either a very sorry Parliament, or a very sorry Administration : For all Men of great Abilities, which enable them to execute either of these Trusts, and of great Fortunes, which are the best Security to the Public, for the faithful Execution of them, must be excluded either from the one or the other. A most dreadful Dilemma sure to this Nation. But do you not really see the utter Impossibility of carrying on the Business of Government, unless those who are concerned in the Administration of it, have Seats in that great Council, where all public Measures are to be canvassed and authorized? Can you imagine to yourself any thing more absurd than a Parliament whence every Man in public Business was excluded,



excluded, debating and resolving Matters of which they must be *totally ignorant*? If the bare Mention of such a Parliament doth not shock you, ask any Member who hath sat there a single Session, and he must be candid enough to satisfy you, that the Business of the Nation cannot be (as it is) conducted in Parliament, unless those who are principally engaged in the conducting it, are Members of that Body,

Alderman.

Suppose I admit this, what a small Number of Placemen will on this Account become necessary?

Gentleman.

As to the Numbers, they are Matter of a different Consideration, and may become the Subject of our Discourse anon. If you admit it is necessary to have some Placemen in the House of Commons, it follows you can have no Objection to my Friends, merely on that Head, and therefore if you have no other, I shall depend on your old Friendship to give me your Interest for them.

Alderman.

To be plain with you, if they were never



ver so unexceptionable, it is not in my Power to serve them, for I am already engaged.

Gentleman.

And to whom, pray?

Alderman.

To Sir *Thomas Leadenhead* and Mr. *Toastum*; Men of such Worth and Honour, that I believe I may defy you to advance a single Objection against them.

Gentleman.

Not any, I confess, stronger than what you might suggest to yourself, especially against one of them; unless you have strangely altered your Way of Thinking since I formerly knew you; for sure I have often heard you maintain the most rigid Principles of a Republican.

Alderman.

I own it, and I promise you I am not altered in the least.

Gentleman.

Can you then require a stronger Objection to any Man, than that he is a *known Jacobite*, which I take to be the case with Sir *Thomas*? The other, indeed, calls himself

self a Whig; but by uniting his Interest with his Fellow-Candidate, I think he gives us the strongest Reason to suspect his own Principles.

Alderman.

The Court, my Friend, hath long cheated us with Names; the Term *Jacobite* is a mere Bugbear, and hath served very well to deceive and amuse the Multitude; but empty Sounds will not impose on me.

Gentleman.

You surprize me; I did not expect to hear this Language at present from any one. It seemed, I own, a strange Doctrine to me, which possessed many some Years ago, that the Spirit of *Jacobitism* was totally extinct among us: But now, when the Nation yet feels the Consequences of a cursed Rebellion, (for sure the most incredulous of your Friends, though they persisted so long in denying the Reality of that Rebellion, have now given up the Point.) An Army of *Higblanders* advancing the *Pretender's* Banners into the very Heart of the Kingdom, is a Proof, I think, that *Jacobitism* is no empty Sound.

Alderman.

And what Assistance, pray, did these *Highlanders* meet with in *England*?

Gentleman.

The usual Assistance which your Friends the *Jacobites* here lend to any Cause. It is true, indeed, they prudently refrained from drawing their Swords; but it is as well known how gloriously and openly they drew their Corks in the Pretender's Favour.

Alderman.

I think, my Friend, I know you thoroughly; and I believe you so honest a Man, that though a Court may misguide, it cannot corrupt you. I will therefore venture to speak out; but first let me secure the Door, that no *Williams* may intrude himself. I will now shew you my Confidence by the most explicit Language. I was bred, as you well know, in republican Principles, and I still retain them in my Heart; though I confess, I have long despaired of seeing any such virtuous Establishment in this Nation. Since then we must have a King, I am pretty indifferent as to the Person, and would in my Choice consult the Good of Old England only. When-  
ever

ever therefore we want a *Redress of Grievances* under any King, what can be so desirable as an Exchange? For by such Exchange we shall more probably be Gainers than Losers.

Gentleman:

You have now spoken out indeed, and I promise you shall not repent your Confidence. By what I can find then, you would turn away a King with less Ceremony, and perhaps for less Cause, than some prudent Men would dismiss a Servant. But how comes it, my Friend, since you have turned *Jacobite*, you have not learnt a little more Respect for this supreme Magistrate? I should rather have expected to hear something of divine, indefeasible, hereditary Right.

Alderman:

You know I have always despised such absurd Notions: I am a *Jacobite* upon republican principles, I assure you.

Gentleman:

You astonish me no less, than if you was to call yourself an *Atheist* upon Christian Principles.

C

Alderman,

Alderman.

There is nothing so absurd in my Tenets as you would endeavour to insinuate. I believe no King to have any Right at all, and therefore, whenever we have Grievances to redress, I would exchange him. This is an honest Doctrine, and a wise one.

Gentleman.

You will pardon me if I think it neither honest nor wise; nay, I hope to convince you it is not. You despise, you say, that indefeasible *Jacobite*-principle of *indefeasible hereditary Right*.

Alderman.

I do from my Soul.

Gentleman.

Then you think King *James* the Second had no such Right, nor of Consequence can his Posterity derive it from him.

Alderman.

Certainly none.

Gentleman.

You will admit, perhaps, that if King  
3 *James*



*James* the Second had any Right which was defeasible, it was defeated by Forfeiture and Abdication. Perhaps you will be better pleased if I say the people did wisely and justly in *exchanging* him.

Alderman.

I admit all this.

Gentleman.

Then the *Pretender* hath no hereditary Right.

Alderman.

None.

Gentleman.

Do you think it will follow from this Admission, that no other hath any Right to the Crown?

Alderman.

Do you really believe any one hath?

Gentleman.

Yes, faith, do I; and so clear and incontestable a Right, that no honest Man, even though he was a Republican in Principle, would endeavour to divest him of the Possession. The divine Right to

Crowns I shall treat with the same Contempt as yourself; but surely the human Rights of a King stand on the same Foundations of natural Reason and Justice with any other Rights whatever. What Right have you to your House, Mr. Alderman, for I think it is your own?

Alderman.

I am in possession of the Deeds, which is, perhaps, more than every Courtier can say.

Gentleman.

Doth not your Right consist in its being conveyed to you from those who had the absolute Property?

Alderman.

Why do you ask so plain a Question?

Gentleman.

And is not the King's Right to his Crown as plain?—In whom is all Civil Power originally and absolutely placed?

Alderman.

Certainly in the People.

Gentleman.

And will not the Voice, not only of our Law,

Law, but of Reason and Justice tell you, that whatever a Man possesses absolutely, he may dispose of, either in Part, or in the Whole, either absolutely or conditionally? That neither he, nor any who claim under him, can resume again what is thus absolutely granted without the Will of him to whom it was granted; or, if granted conditionally, till the Condition be broken?

Alderman,  
This, I believe, is *Law*.

Gentleman.  
And is it not *Reason* and *Justice*?

Alderman,  
I cannot gainsay it.

Gentleman.  
Surely you would think it highly unjust in the Person who sold you your House, or in his Heir, wantonly and of his own Will to turn you out.

Alderman,  
I think I should.

Gentleman.  
Have not then a Body of Men, or a whole  
whole

whole People, the same Power of disposing of what they possess; and are not they, their Heirs and Successors, equally bound by their Grant?

Alderman.

There is great Difference between the Delegation of Power by a whole People, and the Disposition of Property by Individuals; the latter being for the sole Advantage of the Persons to whom the Use is limited, whereas the former is delegated by the People solely for their own Benefit.

Gentleman.

For their own Benefit, I agree; but not *solely* so. Power, and Honour, and generally Riches, attend all Magistrates as the Emoluments of their Office, and this in Republics as well as Monarchies. But from your Distinction, I own, arises a tacite Condition; and this is well understood at present to attend the Crown of *England*, viz. That our Kings shall not go about to subvert the Laws, nor the Constitution of this Kingdom. Nay, this is even express'd in the Coronation Oath. Now, till this Condition is broken, *the King of England hath as solid and as just a Right to his Crown, as any Subject can have to his private Property.*

*perty.* Let us see this in a lower and nearer Light. Would it not be against Law to deprive a subordinate Magistrate of any Office of Honour and Profit, unless he had forfeited it, or unless his Commission was expired?

Alderman.

Surely.

Gentleman.

Would it not be equally against Reason and Justice?

Alderman.

I see your Inference ---- and must frankly own to you, I have not much considered the Matter in this Light.

Gentleman.

I believe it : For you must now observe how necessary the absurd and exploded Doctrines of indefeasible hereditary Right, which we both alike despise, are to reconcile Treason against the present King, even to the Rules of natural Justice : For if the Sovereign Power devolved to the People by the Forfeiture and Abdication of King *James* the Second, the People have most certainly entailed the Crown on the House  
of



of *Hanover*, and his Majesty enjoys it in the Right of that Entail. Here then is a Title which every Republican must acknowledge. Those indeed, who at a time when the Throne was vacant, proposed other Forms of Government, argued perhaps honestly from their own Principles; but the Case is now altered, we are bound by the Act of our Ancestors in this as in every other Instance; and the Traitor, if he doth not hold indefeasible hereditary Right, must appear to himself in the detestable Light of a Rebel.

But this, tho' certainly of itself sufficient, is not all his Majesty's Title. The Parliament, in the Act of Settlement, made no arbitrary nor wanton Disposal of the Crown. They adhered strictly to the Law and Constitution in which the Crown is held to be hereditary, though not indefeasibly so. His Majesty is the next Heir who is capable of enjoying it, being the next Protestant Heir; and would not only have had an incontestable Right to the Crown; but by the Law of this Kingdom, would have been actually and *ipso facto* King, without any Act of Settlement whatever. So that this Act is to be deemed only as corroborative of his Majesty's Title, as an Affirmance of the Common Law, and of all the great constitutional

stitutional Points enacted at the Revolution, particularly that wholesome, necessary and excellent Law, by which Papists are excluded for ever from the Throne.

Hitherto, then I think this Doctrine doth not appear extremely honest. Is not a Traitor against the lawful and rightful Sovereign guilty, at least, of the same Injustice with a Robber? And if we add to this the Guilt of Perjury, which must attend all those who have sworn Allegiance to the present King, the Idea will, I apprehend, afford little Consolation on the Scaffold; nor can it produce much Honour to any Party, or to its Martyrs.

**Alderman.**

I own I cannot answer all this, and yet if you argue for the Right of Kings, it seems hard to deprive innocent Persons of their Right for the Fault of their Ancestors.

**Gentleman.**

I admit, to deprive any Person of his Right, is hard, and what is worse, unjust ; and against this Injustice I have hitherto been arguing. But you are guilty here of a Misrepresentation : For instead of his Right, you should say what would have been

been his Right, had it not been prevented by the Fault of his Ancestors. This then is the Case of all Forfeitures; and have not the innocent Posterity of every Person attainted of Treason or Felony, the same Reason to complain? But by the Forfeiture, a new Right accrues to another; a Right which stands on, and is guarded by, the self same Rules of Justice which protect every other Right. Would it not be unjust to deprive the Son or Grandson of one who was rightfully possessed of a forfeited Estate, and who hath now as good a Right as the Person had who originally forfeited it, and to restore it to the Son or Grandson of that Person, who hath no Right to it at all? Compassion here pleads equally for both, and Justice only for one. On which Side then would be the Hardship? would it not be on that where it is coupled with the highest Injustice? This weak Argument, if it means any thing, goes to destroy all Forfeiture; and in your Case therefore it would maintain indefeasible Right, and in reality absolute Power.

Alderman.

I shall contend for no such Doctrine, I assure you; but you will admit, I believe, that

that if the Crown hath been forfeited, it may be forfeited again.

Gentleman.

I see no ill Consequence in the Admission.

Alderman.

I fancy you will admit too we have some Grievances to complain of.

Gentleman.

They must be Grievances of a very high Nature, Friend, which can amount to this Forfeiture. Such Grievances as must amount to a Breach of the Condition abovementioned, and an Infringement of the Coronation-Oath, by which the People are of consequence absolved from their Allegiance: For to think of this great and awful Magistrate with so little Veneration as to imagine him removeable, on every trifling and perhaps imaginary Complaint, at the Will, or indeed the Caprice of a Party, is inconsistent as well with the Principles of a good Politician as with those of a good Christian. Indeed it is hard to say whether the Condition of such a King or of his People would be more lamentable; the one being constantly liable to the Loss



of his Crown; and the other to a Confusion and Anarchy which always hath ended, and always must end in the Loss of their Liberty.

I think therefore it appears necessary for you to produce some Grievances of a very high Nature, if you would maintain the Honesty of the Principles you have avowed, or, indeed, if you would maintain their Wisdom.

Alderman.

Very well. Will you deny then that our Liberty is in Danger?

Gentleman.

First let me know what you mean by the Word *Liberty*; for though it is in every Man's Mouth, I have often doubted whether we have annexed to it any settled and certain Idea. Many indeed seem to understand by it the Liberty of doing what they please.

Alderman.

By the Liberty of an *Englishman* I mean the Enjoyment of all those Privileges which the Law allows him.

Gentleman.

And can you shew me a single Instance  
2 where



where any Man hath been abridged of this Liberty, under the present Administration, or since the Establishment of the present Royal Family on the Throne? Hath any one Man been executed, arraigned, or imprisoned contrary to the known Laws of this Realm? Have the Estates or Properties of any (even the lowest) Subject been taken away? hath his Right been impeached or his Possession disturbed without the strictest legal Authority? Can we be said then not to enjoy all the Privileges which the Law allows us? On the contrary, do we not enjoy much more? Is not Treason writ in in our News-Papers; and talked and sung and toasted in our Taverns every Day with Impunity? And yet if you consult our Law Books, you will find there are very severe Laws for the Punishment of all these Offences; and if you will turn over the History of former Ages (particularly the Reigns of the *Stuarts*) you will see very bitter Examples of these Punishments. Nay, even of those Persons who have carried their Malice into Act, and have appeared in open Rebellion, hath any been convicted without every Formality which the Law requires? I dare appeal to *Westminster-Hall* for the Integrity, the Justice, the Candour of all the Proceedings against them; so far  
were

were the Judges from shewing the least Partiality on the side of the Crown, that not one strained Construction of any Law, nor even one harsh or indecent Word fell from the Mouth of the King's Council against any one of the Prisoners. Compare this with the Proceedings of former Times, in Trials for Treason (and particularly with those in the Reigns of the *Stuarts*) you will find how much the Spirit of Liberty is strengthened among us by the present Establishment, by his Majesty's own Disposition, and by that of his Ministers. Lastly, to shew how mildly legal Powers in Favour of the Crown have been executed; when the *Habeas Corpus* Act was suspended by Parliament a whole Year, not six Persons were Sufferers by its Suspension, though a dangerous Rebellion then raged in the Nation, and though many Persons were not only suspected, but publicly known to favour it, and only to wait a safe Opportunity of appearing in support of the Cause. Some of these may perhaps be called Instances of too great Mercy in the Royal Mind, and of too great Lenity in his Administration. But surely such amiable Blemishes will not be construed as Grievances, much less represented as Attacks on our Liberty: And I solemnly declare I know no other.

Alderman.

Alderman.

You mistake me. I have not said our Liberties were actually and openly attacked. I only said they were in Danger.

Gentleman.

This of our *Liberty being in Danger*, is a Cant Phrase invented for the same seditious Purposes with that ever-memorable Cant Phrase of the Church being in Danger. Like that, it produces no direct Allegation, much less attempts any Proof; and consequently it admits of no Answer; but, like that, will by Time only be brought into universal Derision and Contempt. In private Life, the causeless Apprehensions of Danger from Persons who have given no Cause of such Suspicion, is thought a certain Symptom of Madness; in Public, they may be called the Phrenzy of the People; and this Words alone without Truth, nay, without Meaning, are always capable of raising. Thus it was remarked by a great Wit of the last Age; That instead of the *Church being in Danger*, it would serve altogether as well for the Purpose of raising a Mob to say the *Monument was in Danger*.

Alderman.

Alderman.

This is Raillery ; but you cannot in Reality imagine the Liberties of any People to be safe where Corruption hath spread itself so universally as among us.

Gentleman.

This is a second Grievance which you charge on the Government. Now admitting the Nation to be as corrupt as you please, do you really think the Government accountable for it ?

Alderman.

Do I ! ay surely : For who else distributes Places, Titles, Ribbands, Pensions, and all other Wages of Corruption !

Gentleman.

Hey ! what a String of Words is here ? Are then all Trusts and Rewards, which the Constitution of *England* hath lodged in the Gift of the Crown to be considered as the Wages of Corruption ? This is very strange and new Doctrine.

Alderman.

Yes, when they are given to unworthy Men for bad Purposes.

Gentleman.



Gentleman.

True; but that is begging the Question. The Things themselves are no Corruption, and you give me no Proof of the bad Purposes, or of the Unworthiness of those to whom they are given.

Alderman.

Pensions, at least, you will grant must be Corruption.

Gentleman.

If these are clandestinely given to Members of Parliament, I will admit it; but do you know of any such? As to other Pensions, they are a necessary Part of the Royal Bounty, and often most laudably and wisely bestowed. But, my Friend, I find by Corruption, you mean Bribery; this is only one Species of Corruption; whereas this Word, when used generally in a political Sense, must comprehend, I conceive, every thing which corrupts the Minds of the People. Now Philosophy will tell you, that all our Passions are equally capable of corrupting the Mind; and Experience must convince you that Envy, Malice, Anger, Hatred, and Revenge, have as powerful a Dominion in the human Breast, as A-

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varice or Vanity, to which two alone the Bribes you mention can be applied. Are then the Arts of Corruption confined to a Court? Are not the Heads of Parties, who are influenced by any of the Passions I have mentioned to unite in an Opposition against the Court, corrupt? What are the People who are misled and inflamed by the grossest Misrepresentations, and blackest Falshoods against the King and his Administration? Are they not corrupted in their Understanding, the most dangerous perhaps of all Corruption? Lastly, what is public Favour and Popularity obtained by inventing and circulating these Falshoods, under the colour and Pretence of Patriotism? Is not this Favour purchased by Corruption?

Alderman.

Most certainly; but I shall not so hastily grant that the Opposition have misrepresented the Court; it appears to me rather that you have misrepresented the Opposition. If you can prove to me indeed that all our Grievances are imaginary.

Gentleman.

If I should be so lucky, you will, I believe, grant that those who have endeavoured to inflame the Nation with imaginary

nary Grievances cannot have acted from the Principles of Patriotism. We must then search after some other Motives to their Actions, and perhaps we need not search long to discover the Views of Men who have formerly been in an Opposition, have grown popular from being so, have succeeded from that Popularity; have obtained the Power which they had opposed, have used that Power much worse than those whom they had opposed, have been removed from it again by their Country, have again set on Foot an Opposition, and have impudently applied a second time to their Country, hoping to corrupt even their Common Sense, and aspiring to a second Establishment in Power, by the Assistance of that Public, whom they have already so grossly betrayed, and who have already by unanimous Consent tumbled them from their Seat.

Alderman.

God forbid there should be many such.

Gentleman.

God forbid it too; but if there are any such, the Patriotism which they and their Partizans affect, may well, I think, be said to be pretended; and the Popularity gained

by this Pretence, may well be imputed to the Corruption I have mentioned. Here then is one Corruption for which the Court is not accountable. Again, what shall we say to other Methods which, perhaps, carry with them least the Appearance of Corruption, and yet bring after them the same Consequences? Doth not the Country Gentleman, who uses the Power of his Fortune *arbitrarily* and *oppressively* to influence his Tenants and his Tradesmen, either in Boroughs or Counties, equally destroy the Freedom of Election with him who pays so much ready Money for a Vote? Indeed every Attempt to deceive the People by misleading their Judgments, to inflame them by misinforming their Opinions, or to compel them by the Power of a private Fortune, are equal Corruptions to Bribery in their Nature, are more certain and efficacious in their Operation, and generally more dangerous in the End proposed.

Now in all these Methods of corrupting, the Opposition have greatly the Advantage of the Court; and are they freer even from that Species which you mentioned, from Bribery itself? Are Bribes distributed at an Election on one Side only? Are not the Cellars and the Coffers of the Country Party, as it is absurdly called, open on this Occasion?

Occasion? Are not the Wages of Iniquity distributed in as gross a Manner on that Side as on the other? Are there not as many and as bare-fac'd Instances on Record of Bonds and Notes by those who have espoused the Opposition and been espoused by them, as can be shewn on the Part of the Administration? Lastly, do not the Incumbrances on the Estates of Country Gentlemen, often to the Ruin of them and their Families, stand as perpetual Monuments of the Methods which they have pursued at their Elections? So that Corruption seems as unfairly to be charged on the Government, as a Plague would be, if such raged universally in the Nation.

Alderman.

I thank you kindly, Sir, for the Hint, since I believe you will acknowledge, that in the Case you mention of a Plague, our Governors wou'd deserve the highest Censure, if they did not immediately endeavour to prevent its spreading, and to put a Stop to it as soon as possible; especially if it should appear that the Way to effect this was easy, and chalked out to them.

Gentleman.



Gentleman.

Is it so easy then to put a Stop to this universal Corruption?

Alderman.

I will venture to say it is; and that two Bills, for which the Public have long called, (I may say groaned) would effectually do it. You must know I mean the Place-Bill, and the Bill for annual, or at most triennial Parliaments.

Gentleman.

Another Grievance then complained of is, that the present Administration have not given you that Idol (as you think it) of the Public, the Place-Bill. Now I am afraid there is great Superstition in the Worship of this Idol, and it would be equally unable with any popish Saint to bestow on its Votaries what they expected from it. However, I think, you have given up an universal Place-Bill.

Alderman.

I own the great Officers of State seem necessary to be allowed.



Gentleman.

And do you think there are no Place-Bills already?

Alderman.

Why are there?

Gentleman.

Many, I promise you. There are several Offices which are at this Day inconsistent with Seats in Parliament. Nay, there is one Place-Bill enacted this very Parliament, by which great Numbers of inferior Place-Men are excluded from being hereafter Members of the House of Commons.

Alderman.

I never heard, I assure you, of any such Law.

Gentleman.

Very likely not, nor would you hear of another if it was farther extended; because it will never be thought by your republican or *Jacobite* Friends to have gone far enough, till it becomes an universal Place-Bill: But so many Restrictions of this kind have been already made, that unless we suppose

suppose some other undue Influence, the Court can never succeed in any popular Measures by this alone. The Number of Place-Men will hereafter be so inconsiderable, that we must suppose some undue Influence of another kind, or it could not be effectual: Nay, I will venture to say, there hath never yet been a Vote carried in the House of Commons in which great Numbers who have had no Places have not concurred: In proportion, therefore, as the Numbers of Place-Men abate, this other Influence must encrease. If, therefore, we can suppose a Minister capable of carrying Points by Corruption, we must see that this Corruption would be at the Expence of the Public, and consequently, the more general a Place-Bill is, the more it would enhance the public Expence by the Encrease of Pensioners: For the Place-Men must be still paid; since you would not, I suppose, deprive the Government of Officers, though you would exclude these from Parliament.

Alderman.

But I fancy, my good Friend, you have heard of a Pension-Bill, as well as of a Place-Bill.

Gentleman,

If we exclude these two, the Court will find it difficult, I believe, to procure a Majority.

Gentleman.

But this, I am afraid, is a harder Task than you imagine. I think I may call it impossible. Pensions and Gratuities may be given without Witness, and without being liable to any possibility of legal Proof: How will you guard against this? By Oaths? I am sorry to say sad Experience convinces us, that the Multiplication of Oaths serves to little other purpose than the dreadful Propagation of Perjury. I might mention an Oath of much the same Nature enacted by Parliament to prevent Bribery at Elections, and the bare mention of it is enough to fill any honest Man with Horror. This is indeed the most inadequate of all Methods to restrain Men from doing Evil; for when Interest hath once gotten the better of Honour and Honesty, the Sanction of an Oath will generally be little regarded. But admit that some Men should set to themselves a *ne plus ultra* in Iniquity, and tho' they may not be with-held by the Rules of Honour or Honesty, would yet be frightened by manifest Perjury; may not these Gratuities be called by so many

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Names,

Names, and conveyed in so many different Ways, that Consciences not over-scrupulous might find sufficient Evasions to satisfy themselves, and explain away their Oath ? Nay, admitting that some Consciences should be too nice for any Evasion whatever, and could by no Means be brought to accept any such Gratitude themselves, may not these, however, be as much influenc'd by Favours conferred on their Children, or on other Relations ? In reality, these Bills have been represented to be of much more Consequence than they are ; for Corruption is too stubborn an Evil to be cured, or even palliated by any such Remedies.

Alderman.

Corruption is certainly a very stubborn Evil, especially when it is so rooted, as it is at present in this Kingdom. But what can you say against annual Parliaments ? The Reasons for our desiring these are, I believe, too strong for you to encounter ; for indeed I have never heard any one attempt to give an Answer to them.

Gentleman.

Your present Acquaintances, the *Jacobites*, are much abler at Allegations than at Answers ;



Answers; for I think they have never yet been so good to give a single Answer to all which hath been advanced against their absurd Principles. Their Arguments and their Weapons are indeed one and the same; *Songs and Toasts, Curses and Huzzas*. Indeed in this they act consistently enough; for as it is a Cause in behalf of which no Man, though his Wit was ever so great, could say any thing, so is it a Cause for which no Man would fight who had even a single Grain of common Sense. I shall not therefore be deterred by their Example, but am as sanguine in my Hopes of answering this Grievance as much to your Satisfaction, as I seem to have answered the other. Let me ask you, then, what Advantage you propose from an annual Parliament?

Alderman.

That it would not be in the Power of a Minister to corrupt either the Electors or Elected.

Gentleman.

You think the Expence would be so great?



Alderman.

Certainly.

Gentleman.

So much the worse for us, for we must find the Money to corrupt them; but to confess the Truth, it would have no such Consequence. On the contrary, would you not be surpriz'd, could I convince you that this fine plausible Scheme would of all others bid the fairest for putting Parliaments absolutely into the Hands of a Minister, and that without giving him any Trouble at all with the Electors, and not much more with the Elected.

Alderman.

This would surprize me indeed.

Gentleman.

By what Right doth any Man sit in Parliament?

Alderman.

Why, by being elected by his Country.

Gentlemen.

You should rather say by being returned elected; for if the Person so returned had

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not a single good Vote, he would have a Right to sit there, and the other Party would be driven to his Petition. What then would be the Case, if a Minister could corrupt such a Number of returning Officers as might, when joined to such of his Friends and Dependents as could be fairly elected, secure himself a safe Majority in the House at their first sitting? This is no strange, forced, or improbable Supposition; on the contrary, this Majority, if we admit such universal Corruption as you complain of, must be with the greatest Ease obtained. The Persons necessary to be corrupted for that Purpose are neither considerable in Number or in Fortune. Reason will tell us, these Men are as liable to Corruption as any others; nay, Experience must convince us, that they have been corrupted in the most flagrant Manner. Now is it not certain, that before the Rights of ten Members could be adjusted, the Minister might have done *his* Business, and might send his Parliament about theirs?

And farther, though an annual Parliament might by such Methods become very dangerous to their Country, they would be very little formidable to the Minister himself. Long Parliaments have Opportunities to form Cabals, which have been  
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often fatal to bad Minsters (and sometimes I am afraid to good ones.) It was principally owing to the short Date of Parliaments that they had formerly so little Weight in our Constitution. King *Charles* the First or his wicked Ministers seemed sensible of this, and were therefore willing to have pursued the old Road. And it was a Parliament, which from its Duration was called the *Long Parliament*, which to their immortal Honour preserved the Liberties of this Kingdom, when they were *really in Danger*.

Alderman.

I honour the *Long Parliament* as much as any Man; and I frankly own you have said more against annual Parliaments, than I thought could have been suggested; but the Triennial Bill, I apprehend, is unexceptionable; and this, perhaps, would equally secure us from the Danger of Corruption, with an annual Parliament.

Gentleman.

Perhaps it might; but why should we imagine either would be less corruptible than that which is Septennial? Do Men require so long time to be corrupted? Look into the History of those Parliaments, which have  
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been suspected of undue Influence ; are the first Sessions of those Parliaments less suspicious than the last ?

Alderman.

It would not be worth a Minister's while to corrupt a Triennial Parliament.

Gentleman.

It must be evidently worth his while : For the Business of the Nation must be carried on in a Triennial Parliament, and the Minister may be destroyed by it.

Alderman.

It would not be worth the while of the Members to receive the Wages of Corruption.

Gentleman.

That is altogether as strange a Doctrine. All Wages are in Proportion to the Duration of the Service ; and it is as good for the Labourer to receive his Hire for six Years under two Contracts, as under one. If we allow that a Majority is necessary to screen a bad Minister, or to carry on his wicked Purposes ; the only Question with him will be, can it be purchased or no ? If the Members are above Corruption, so would



would they be if they were chosen for seven Years, as well as chosen only for three. It should seem indeed, according to all Rules of Traffick, that a Majority in the Triennial would be bought cheaper; but admit the contrary, they must be had by a wicked Minister, if possible, whatever be the Price; and they themselves will enable him to defray it.

Alderman.

If Elections returned so frequent, it would be impossible to corrupt the Electors.

Gentleman.

As the Shortness of Time for which they are elected cannot make the Members less corruptible, so neither would it, I conceive, effect this Alteration in the Electors. A Man who sells his Vote once in seven Years, will be equally ready to sell it once in three. If then we allow Corruption to have spread so deplorably as you imagine, would not this be a most effectual Means to spread it wider, nay, even to make it universal, since it would be a Trade constantly carried on. The Horror of all Crimes is lessened by frequent Examples of those Crimes before our Eyes; hence Offenders grow more hardened, and the Innocent are encouraged



encouraged to become Offenders. Elections would thus in many Places be the Principal, if not the only *Trade* regarded, and the Price of Corruption, instead of being advanced, would probably be decreased; but let the Price be what it will, and the Market never so frequent, the Minister must go to Market and the Nation must pay.

But farther, if notwithstanding all the Arts of Corruption used on the other Side, the Court can out-bid the Country in a septennial Election, would not the Alteration proposed, be greatly in favour of the former? Do not Country Gentlemen already complain that they are undone by the Expence of an Election, once in seven Years, how much more unable would they be to support this Contention once in three Years? And as for all these other Arts which I have before mentioned, and shewn to be on their Side only, would they not be greatly weakened by the Triennial Scheme? So short a Period would hardly allow them time to enflame the People, to invent Grievances, and sufficiently to circulate Falshoods against the King and his Administration.

Alderman.

Do not attempt to be jocular, when you  
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represent us to be in so melancholy a Situation.

Gentleman.

I only pursue that Opinion of general Corruption, which you asserted.

Alderman.

Can you lay your Hand on your Heart, and deny the Truth of the Assertion.

Gentleman.

As to the Corruption practised at Elections, it is so known and certain, that I should think no Man deserved the least Credit who denied it; but as to the Corruption of the Elected, I can lay my Hand on my Heart and declare, I believe it to be infinitely less than it hath been represented: However, admitting it was otherwise, and that Corruption was in both Cases universal, I think, I have plainly shewn that the Bills you have desired would be so far from curing it, that they would tend only to aggravate its ill Consequences.

Alderman.

Though I am not able to answer all your Arguments; it is difficult to persuade me that the Public should so eagerly desire what  
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is hurtful to themselves, or that the Ministry should so obstinately adhere to the Good of the People against their own Consent.

Gentleman.

Neither of these are so improbable as you think. To deceive the People into mistaken Notions concerning their true Interest is no impossible (I am afraid, no difficult) Task. Whoever can put together a few pompous popular Words and pronounce them well, may, to use the Language of a very sensible Writer, *whistle the Public together, then get on their Backs and ride them at his Pleasure.* And why should not the Ministry obstinately adhere to the Public Good? Is not the present Administration composed of a Number of Men of the greatest Property in this Kingdom? Who would be so great Losers by any Injury done the Public; by enslaving or impoverishing the Nation, as those who have the largest Possessions in it? Can we believe that such Men would entail Slavery or Beggary on their Posterity? Can any rational Motive be assigned for such a Behaviour in Men to whom we may apply the Scripture Sentiment, with respect to our Souls; *What will they gain by the Loss of their Liberty? or, What shall they have in*

*exchange for it?* It seems, I think, not so very improbable that *such* a Ministry should obstinately adhere to the Good of the Public, even against their Consent. Their Situation in Business makes them the best Judges of this Public Good; and their larger Share of Property, makes them the most interested in its Promotion.

But farther, how are you sure that the Ministry, if they desired to indulge the Public with their favourite Idol, contrary to Reason and good Policy, could however succeed in this Desire? The Interest which every Member hath in opposing such a Bill, seems too obvious to be mentioned; and what should induce them to pass such a Law? Not public Utility: For beside what hath been already advanced on that Head, a septennial Parliament hath great Advantage over the other two: For if the Liberty of this Country wholly consists in that Share of Power which is lodged in the Representatives of the People, it follows, that by how much the higher this Power is, and by how much the more Weight it carries in the Scale of our Constitution, so much the higher and stronger is our Liberty. Now to give this Body of our Representatives any Weight at all; or to make them more than nominally a Branch of our Constitution, some Degree of Duration



is necessary ; and the longer and more permanent this is, the greater will most certainly be their Power. I appeal to both Reason and Experience for the Truth of this : For Reason makes it plainly evident in Theory, that no Body which is eternally in a State of Fluctuation can acquire any political Strength, and Experience will shew this to be true in Fact, not only from the History of all other Countries, but from our own Annals, where we shall find the Power of the Commons, encreasing in our Constitution, as it hath encreased in Duration ; and that long Parliaments only have been able to effect any thing notable in Defence of our Liberties : For what Weight indeed can a Body eternally fluctuating have in that Scale of Power where it is opposed to what is permanent and perpetual, as the other two Branches of our Constitution are known to be ?

Alderman.

This Argument, I am afraid, proves too much, and will go to substitute a perpetual instead of a septennial Parliament. So that we should give up all future Right of Election, and make Seats in the House of Commons descendible to the Heir, as those of the Peers are.

Gentleman.



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Gentleman.

Gentleman.

*Est modus in rebus*; my Friend; such a House of Commons would be no longer Representatives of the People; and it is easy to see in that Case where the Balance of Power would lie, and what would be the Consequence of it. The Circumstance I have mentioned, however, serves to corroborate what I have here advanced: For as a perpetual Parliament would have more Power than a Septennial; so hath, for the same Reason, the Septennial over those for which you have above contended. The Perpetual would have too much, and the Annual and Triennial infinitely too little.

Alderman.

As I have not considered this Matter before I cannot pretend to give it an immediate Answer.

Gentleman.

But the House of Commons would expect an Answer to it, as well as to all the other Matters I have mentioned on this Subject; and such Answers, in which the Arguments against septennial Parliaments should greatly preponderate, before they can be expected to pass a Law so visibly contrary to their

their own Interest. Would you have the Minister use any of that undue Influence which you have exclaimed against on this Occasion? But what Degree of Corruption must we suppose necessary to prevail on Men to sacrifice, not only their Honour, but their Interest, and the Good of the Public, to the Desire of a Ministry. Such a Degree of Corruption as this never hath yet, and I firmly believe never will infect our Legislature. There is a wide Difference, my good Friend, between such a Majority on the Side of the Government, as will suffer public Business to go on, by placing some Confidence in the Administration, and by assisting the Crown in pursuing vigorous Measures, when such are necessary, against its Enemies, on the one Hand; and such a Majority on the other, as will hearken implicitly to the Voice of a Minister without any Attention to the Good of the People. Without the former of these no Administration can stand a Moment, nor even the Government itself subsist. A Truth of which some hot-brain'd Men were lately so sensible, that they relinquished the Reins almost as soon as they had taken Possession of them. But of a Majority of the latter Kind, I thank God our Annals can produce no Instance: For I may challenge the most  
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malicious Malecontent during all the Time in which the Clamours against Corruption have run so very high, *that they have been ecchoed by the most corrupt Men amongst us*, to produce one single Instance of any Law which hath struck at the Root of our Constitution, or which hath attempted to undermine our Liberties: And what must be the Inference; but either that we have had no Minister wicked enough to aim at carrying any such Point, which few, I believe, will chuse to confess, or that his Influence in the Legislature was never sufficient to embolden him to attempt it.

Upon the whole, to deny that there is any Corruption in this Nation, would be to fly in the Face not only of Truth, but of public Notoriety. Indeed, to speak a bold political Truth, some Degree of Corruption always hath attended, and always will attend a rich and flourishing Nation. The virtuous Principles on which the *Roman Commonwealth* was founded, excluded this no longer than till Wealth flowed in upon them. Their Satyrists, you remember, introduces his Complaints of their Corruption by these Words:

*Paupertas Romana perit* —

and



and presently adds,

*Prima peregrinos obscæna Pecunia mores  
Intulit ; & turpi fregerunt secula Luxu  
Divitiæ Molles —*

Among us it had an early Introduction. My Lord *Clarendon* speaks of it as known long before his time, and very openly blames King *Charles* and his Ministers for not using it ; but in reality they despised the Power of the People too much, and hoped entirely to destroy that Power.

Nothing, I apprehend therefore, can appear more unjust than this Charge of Corruption on the present Government ; which neither introduced nor can possibly cure it. And can we expect, that when the Enemies of the present Establishment, are so manifestly busy in employing every Art, fair and foul, open and secret, to corrupt the Nation ; to mislead, inflame and bribe them against their own true Interest, and against the King and his Administration ; that the Government should sit still and use no Attempts for its own Security. To defend yourself with the same sort of Weapons by which you are attacked, hath always been held lawful ; and even Corruption, as the

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great Man I have above cited acknowledges, becomes justifiable when defensive.

*Cato* himself, the great Patron and Martyr of *Roman* Liberty, in this sense, not only admitted its Utility, but practised it. He was himself at the Head of a Subscription to bribe the *Romans* for their own Good, and to keep Men out of public Trusts, who attacked the Liberty of their Country, and at last destroyed it, *by the same factious Methods*, and by the *same popular Outcries* which are now practised and raised within this Kingdom.

In this defensive Way only the present Government can be fairly said to apply to any Arts of Corruption; and in this sense, I sincerely think, every honest impartial Man will own, that some Degree of it may be necessary to preserve not only the King on his Throne, but the Religion and Liberties of this Nation; all which are by the blackest Corruption attempted to be undermined.

And in this defensive Sense only can any kind of Corruption be necessary to the present Government: For if the People were not deceived and misinformed; if they were not inflamed, and compelled and bribed by the several Parties who unite in Opposition; I think, I may with great certainty affirm, that their own Interest alone  
would

would bias them sufficiently in Favour of the present Government ; and that Loyalty to his Majesty King GEORGE, would be universally, as I hope it now is in most Places, the best Recommendation of a Candidate to their Election.

Alderman.

And do you really think this would be the Case, when the Nation is plunged over Head and Ears in an unnecessary, burthensome, grievous ----- I will call it *Hanoverian* War, and when we are almost devoured by Taxes?

Gentleman.

These two Charges, my Friend, amount but to one. Or rather I may say the latter is the necessary Consequence of the former. Every War must have Taxes to support it ; and such a War as the present, must be supported by very high Taxes : For however it may deserve the other Epithets, which you have been pleased to affix to it, all must allow the War in which we are now unhappily engaged to be both grievous and burthensome. This is a Circumstance sure worthy to be lamented ; but no Cause of Complaint against the Administration, unless the War shall appear to be really unnecessary,

and unless it shall appear that the present Administration have involved us in it.

Now this being a complicated Question, as we are at present engaged in a War both with *France* and *Spain*, it may be proper to consider them distinctly.

First then, as to the War with *Spain*; this was most certainly undertaken at the earnest Desire of the *British* Merchants, who had long complained of the Insults and Encroachments made by the *Spaniards* on the Trade of this Nation. It will not be said by any Man living, that this was either a War of Ambition, or enter'd into upon any Motives of ministerial Interest, or from any other Cause than a Regard to the Voice of the People, after long and repeated Endeavours to avoid it by amicable Means. But as you and your Friends have never complained of its being rashly undertaken, or unnecessarily prolong'd, but merely of its being delay'd, I need say no more upon this Article.

As to the War with *France*; the present Administration, at their first coming into Power, that is, when a certain great Earl had been obliged to lay down the Seals, found the Nation already engaged in it, as well as in that with *Spain*. You will also observe, that War was declared not by us upon *France*, but by *France* upon us, at the Instigation of  
*Spain*,



*Spain*, after a Battle at Sea, in which she openly assisted that Crown, to whose Fleets she had before given Protection several times against ours ; not to mention a Design she had formed in the Year 1743, of invading this Kingdom in Favour of the Pretender, and a Commission given to one of her Admirals in the *West Indies*, to have attack'd our Settlements there. It cannot therefore be said that the *French* War ought to be charged upon this Administration, unless defending the Nation against the most open and outrageous Attacks can be call'd involving it in a War. It must be farther observed, that, besides their Declaration of War against *England*, which left us no Option what Part to take, the *French* Arms were at that Time employ'd against *Flanders*. By what Mistakes in our Conduct they were drawn thither, I will not say ; it is enough for the Defence of *this* Ministry, that these Mistakes cannot be charged upon *them*, as all who know any thing of the past Conduct of Business at home and abroad very well know. But into *Flanders* the War *now* was brought, and being there, what would you have had our Government do ? Would you have had them allow the *French* to carry their Conquests on there without Opposition, till the whole seventeen Provinces, for the Preservation of which



which we have formerly spent so much Money and Blood, had been quietly added to the Dominions of *France* ? What, I say, in that case, would you have had our Government do ?

Alderman.

I would have had them withdraw all our Forces from abroad, have carried on the War only at Sea, and have let the Continent go to the Devil.

Gentleman.

Friend, Friend ; when the Devil is Master of the Continent, he will, let me tell you, be much too near a Neighbour to *England*. We shall have only the narrow Seas between Him and Us, and he must be a foolish Devil indeed if he can't find a way to get over to us in that Situation. I should think it much better Policy to keep him more at a Distance ; for it is with States as with private Persons ; they who do not resist him at his first Approaches, are very ill able to do so when he hath broke into their Fences, and master'd their Outworks. But let me a little examine the Nature of your Proposition. In order to resist *France* and *Spain* (the two confederate Devils with whose joint Power we are now to contend) you are of Opinion that we should

should have thrown down our Arms upon the Continent, have left our Allies to take care of themselves, and have confined our Operations to a Sea War alone. Now the unavoidable Consequence of this would have been an immediate separate Peace, upon such Terms as *France* and *Spain* would have thought fit to give, between those two Crowns, the Empress Queen, and the King of *Sardinia*. For if these Powers, with all the Assistance now given by *England*, are but just able to stand out against *France* and *Spain*, how could they hope to do it effectually when that Assistance should be withdrawn? Another certain and terrible Consequence of our taking this Party, would have been the Submission of the *United Provinces* to an entire Dependence on *France*, or, to speak plain, their being subjected to her; such a Dependence as must have ensued upon our acting that part, being indeed a Subjection, in softer Terms. I say, as must have ensued upon our acting that Part; for if the *Dutch* Government was ready to throw itself into the Arms of *France*, even with all the Spirit our Army could give to the honest Party there, how impossible would it have been to have prevented their following the Bent of those Inclinations, if they had seen their Frontier entirely abandoned, and the very Heart of their Provinces at the Mercy of

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an Army ten Times superior in Strength to their own. What could the Fleet of *England* have done to hinder this, and how long, after such an Accession of maritime Power to *France*, would this Fleet have continued superior to those of that Crown and *Spain* united? No longer ago than in the Reign of *Louis XIV.* at the Time of the first Grand Alliance, the combined Navies of *England*, *Spain* and *Holland* were barely a Match for the single Navy of *France*, tho' *Holland* was then a great maritime Power. What would the Inequality be of our Fleet alone, against the combined Force of *France* and *Spain*, when neither of these Powers would have any Thing else to do with their Money, but to apply it to strengthen their Fleets, assisted by all that would remain of the Shipping and Seamen of *Holland* and *Zealand*, which *France* must, in that Case, have entirely at her Disposition? And if our Fleets could not be sufficient to guard us against an Invasion, how could any Army we could keep up, be able to resist the whole Armies of *France* and *Spain*; for which they would then have no other Employment but to pour them at once into *England* and *Ireland*; where they would be sure to be joined and assisted by all their *Popish* and *Jacobite* Friends, without a single Ally remaining to *England*, either to make any Di-

version in favour of us upon the Continent, or to send us over any Succours against such a terrible and fatal Attack?

Alderman.

I protest you frighten me. I begin to think our withdrawing Measure not quite so safe as our Friends represent it.

Gentleman.

If your Friends mean to serve the Pretender, they cannot advise a better. But let us now, on the other hand, see what hath happened from our having acted a contrary Part. The King of *Sardinia* is still an useful Ally of *Great-Britain*, and a formidable Enemy to *France* and *Spain*. The ambitious Designs of the House of *Bourbon* in *Italy* have been hitherto disappointed. The Empire is fixed in the House of *Austria*; and her Arms, in Conjunction with ours, are now protecting the *United Provinces*. The Election of a Stadtholder there is an Event of the highest Importance, not only to the Issue of the present War, but to the future Safety and Welfare of that Commonwealth, and of *Great Britain*, by confirming and knitting more closely the Union of the two Countries, and by enabling the former to act with more Spirit and Vigour, whenever

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the Defence of the Common Cause shall hereafter require it; especially in the Support of the Protestant Succession established here in his Majesty's Family.

Alderman.

I don't know whether, as a Lover of Liberty, I ought to rejoice at this Event. A Stadtholder may endanger the Freedom of the *Dutch* Commonwealth.

Gentleman.

True; but without a Stadtholder the King of *France* would be sure to oppress it. Lovers of Liberty are sometimes the Dupes of their own Zeal. Some such in *Holland* have been seduced by the *French*, as some here by the *Jacobites*, to do their Work for them, and carry on the Designs of absolute Power, out of an extravagant Passion for Freedom. *Servitutis odio in servitutem ruunt.* But the *Dutch*, I thank God, have now opened their Eyes, and I hope the *English* will do so too.

Alderman.

If this Event be a happy one, it is not to be ascribed to the Government here, but to the Spirit of the People in *Holland* and *Zealand*.

Gentleman.

Gentleman.

That Spirit could never have risen, or must have been instantly, and for ever subdued, if there had not been an Army of 110,000 Men with a Duke of *Cumberland* at the Head of them, to raise and protect it. Without that Assistance as well as the Help of our Ships, not the Prince of *Orange*, but the *French* King would have been, in effect, the Stadtholder of the *Seven Provinces*, and quiet Sovereign of the other *Ten*.

Alderman.

You think then that *France* hath been baffled in *Flanders*.

Gentleman.

No; she hath done a great deal in that Part of the World, but she hath been hindered from doing a great deal more. The *Dutch* are still independent, and more so than they were when this War begun; and though almost all *Flanders* hath been conquered by *France*, she hath not the same Hold of it as she would have had by the Submission of *Holland*, and by such a Peace as must then have been made with her. She may now be compelled to make a Peace that

that will restore these Conquests again, and will provide for the future Security of the *Low Countries*, even better than before. For it is not the Number or Fortifications of Towns, but an Army able and willing to defend them, that makes a real Barrier ; and if the Revolution which hath happened in the *United Provinces* shall give them That, I shall think them in a much better State of Defence than they have been for some time ; though some of the Towns that may be restored to them by the Treaty of Peace shall have been dismantled.

Alderman.

Will you pretend to persuade me that we are not in a bad State abroad ?

Gentleman.

No, I will not. Our State is certainly dangerous. We have Enemies to contend with almost too strong for us, the two greatest, I own, in *Europe* ; whose Resources almost are inexhaustible, who neither value the Miseries or Complaints of their Subjects, who force Money from them wherever it is, and can make War much cheaper than we. Add to this, that one of them hath not only an Army of 300,000 Men, but is better skilled in the Art and Science of War,

War, particularly in Engineering, than any other Power in *Europe*, of which we have felt the Effects very severely. Besides the Strength of our Enemies, we are also to struggle with the Weakness and Wants of some of our Friends, with the partial Views, and wanton Ambition of others, with their discordant Interests, with their mutual Jealousies, and with all those complicated Difficulties that weaken Confederacies, and often defeat the best Measures, and wisest Schemes for the common Good. If in the Issue of such a Contention we can come off without being undone, it is the utmost we are to expect.

Alderman.

Methinks you give but a very indifferent Character of our Allies.

Gentleman:

We must take them such as they are, not such as we wish them to be. It is not in the Power of the *English* Government to alter the State and Nature of Things. They can neither remove these inherent Defects from the Alliance, nor prevent the ill Consequences that necessarily flow from them.

Alderman.



Alderman.

If we cannot mend such Allies, at least we may quit them.

Gentleman.

It would be very bad Policy to punish them by destroying ourselves. And to forsake the Alliance in our present Circumstances would certainly bring on our own Destruction.

Alderman.

I cannot but think, we ought by our Influence to check and correct their Follies or Faults.

Gentleman.

I think so too, as far as possible, and in some Instances this hath been done. The putting an End to the unhappy and ruinous War, between the Houses of *Austria* and *Brandebourg*, which while it continued to rage, was the Triumph of *France*, and the utter Defeat of the common Cause; the composing, I say, this fatal Quarrel, was entirely owing to his Majesty's Influence over the Councils of the Court of *Vienna*. In advising which salutary Measure, it is as certain a Truth, that the present Administration

nistration have the greatest Merit to their Country, as that the late Administration had none; but are, on the contrary, justly responsible for all the ill Consequences of having thrown the King of Prussia into the Arms of France, by fomenting the Passions of the Court of Vienna against him; which was the original Cause of the War in Germany: For it is sure that France would have never undertaken that War, or have broken her own Guarantee of the Pragmatick Sanction, if the Court of Berlin had not been driven to act in Concert with her, by the Effect of these Councils. Who they were that advised these destructive Measures, and that have since talked of *Exterminating the King of Prussia*, instead of healing the Differences between him and the Imperial Court, is very well known to all the World. But if those Differences had not been healed by the Prevalence of more sober Councils, instead of the King of Prussia being exterminated, the whole System of Germany had been destroyed, and France would, without Opposition, have made herself Mistress of Italy and of the Seven Provinces; the Preservation of both these is, indeed, owing to the Force, which, in Consequence of the Peace happily made between the Empress Queen

and the Court of *Berlin*, the former hath been able to send into those Countries.

Now let me ask you, whether in making that Peace the Interest of *Hanover* prevailed, or the Interest of *England*? Electoral Jealousies might have pursued the Weakening of a Rival Power in the Empire, even at the Risk of the Common Cause; but the Interest of *England* demanded a Union between the two Houses of *Austria* and *Brandenburg*, and that Interest, we see, was preserved by the Wisdom of his Majesty, and the honest Zeal of his present Administration.

*This Peace* then is not *Hanoverian*. Let us see whether *the War* we now carry on be, as you call it, *Hanoverian*. Is *Hanover* or *England* concerned in the Defence of *Flanders* and *Holland*? Is *Hanover* or *England* concerned in opposing the Greatness of the House of *Bourbon* in *Italy*, and in keeping the King of *Sardinia* independent on *France*? *The King of England* hath, no doubt, a great Interest in the maintaining a powerful Emperor at the Head of the *Germanick* Body, in order to form on that Side, a considerable Barrier against the Power of *France*, and for the Preservation of *Flanders*, in the Hands of the House of *Austria*; but *the Elector of Hanover*, as well

as some other Princes of *Germany*, might better find his Account in having a weak Head of the Empire, to whom the Electors might give the Law. In what Sense then can it be said, that the War carried on by the Councils of those who are *now* his Majesty's Ministers, purely upon Motives relating to *England*, with which his Electorate hath nothing to do, is an *Hanoverian* War? As well may you call the two last Wars made by King *William* and Queen *Anne*, *Hanoverian*. This is entirely founded upon the same Principles. The Cause, the Enemy, the Nature, and Objects of the War are the same; with this only Difference, that none can complain of this being prolonged, as that of Queen *Anne* was said to be, from Views of Ambition, or a Desire of making great Conquests in *France*. The present Councils of *England* are by no means infatuated with any such Dreams: As far as the Public can judge of them, they tend to no more than a good Peace; good, I mean, in Proportion to the State and Condition of our Affairs, to the Defensive Purposes, upon which alone we have carried it on, and to our Engagements with our Allies, founded upon our true Interests.



Alderman.

Do you hope to procure such a Peace as you here describe?

Gentleman.

The Practicability of it will greatly depend upon the Choice of the new Parliament. If the Opposition prevails, we have two Things to fear; either a shameful and fatal Desertion of our Allies and Interests on the Continent, which is the Scheme of some who are engaged in that Opposition, or a no less ruinous Forwardness to continue the War upon Objects or Passions in which the true Interest or Honour of *England* hath no real or weighty Concern, which the past Conduct of others who bear a principal Part in the same Opposition gives too much Cause to apprehend. Either of these would prevent our attaining such a Peace as I have described, and plunge the Nation into infinite Difficulties and endless Calamities. But if the good Genius of *England* shall, as I doubt not it will, get the better of both, and such a Parliament shall be returned as will support the present Administration, while they continue to support the Cause of their Country, there is Reason to hope that they will bring us at last into a safe and  
happy

happy Port. For we could never have weather'd such Storms as we have done, if the Ship had not been strong, and ably conducted. What a Hurricane did we go through, when, besides two great foreign Wars, we had a Rebellion to contend with at Home ! What an Advantage did that give to our Enemies ! Yet, by the Blessing of God, by the Wisdom of his Majesty, the Valour and Conduct of his Son, and the Care of his Administration, that Danger hath been conquered, and his Throne and Kingdom, nay, I may say, the whole Constitution have gained an additional Strength from the Attempt so wickedly made to overturn them. This is an Earnest of what we may hope from the same Hands, if they are not obstructed in the great Work they have to do. On the other Side, with whatever Success our Enemies may have been crowned in some Parts of the World, during the Course of this War, they have failed and suffered as much in others ; their Finances and Trade are almost ruin'd, their Wealth is become our Prize ; nor can they long hope, without these Nerves of War, to pursue the Designs of their Ambition, or resist the Efforts of a Confederacy, which they find they are not able to break or divide. We have a noble Army in *Flanders*, led by a General who hath

the Confidence and Love of his Troops, whose very Name is dreaded by theirs ; and who, if the Enemy venture out of their Lines, will, probably, add to the Palm of *Culloden*, a still nobler Wreath ; but this he is too prudent to seek at too great Disadvantage, or to follow the Ardour of his Courage at the Expence of the Safety of his Country, and of that Common Cause which he defends. At Sea we have a most powerful and victorious Fleet, under two Admirals, who have retrieved the Glory of the Navy of *England*, and to whom we owe the greatest Advantages gain'd in this War. All this must naturally incline the *French* and *Spaniards* to think of Peace, especially if *Genoa* should soon be taken, and another Irruption made into *France* : Or if they should still obstinately reject all reasonable Terms, though no Man can answer for the Events of War, yet we have no Cause to believe, that the Campaign will be unfavourable or disadvantageous to the Allies. This we may depend on, that no Opportunity, either of making Peace or War advantageously, will be lost, by those who now have the Conduct either of our Arms or Negotiations.

Alderman.

Alderman.

You say a great deal for your Friends ;  
but all do not see them in the same Light.

Gentleman.

No---for many see them in very false Lights ;  
in the odious Colours that are thrown upon  
them by the Prejudice of Party, by the  
Malice of Enemies, or by the Envy of Ri-  
vals. But look at their Actions, and you  
will discern their true Characters. Consider  
the Difficulties they have had to contend  
with ; the Firmness, the Temper, the Mild-  
ness, the Prudence with which they have  
acted ; always pursuing a great National Plan,  
without stepping aside from it, either out of  
Resentment to those who opposed them, or  
from Flattery, or Fear, or any one private  
and partial Consideration. Have you con-  
sidered the Persons of whom this Admini-  
stration is composed ? I will be bold to say,  
that if you look for the Men of the largest  
Property, of the longest Experience in Bu-  
siness, of the brightest, and of the most solid  
Parts, of the highest Reputation for Know-  
ledge and Learning, of the most acknow-  
ledged Integrity in private Life, you will  
find them in this Administration.

Alderman.



Alderman.

Indeed you surprize me; for their Adversaries talk of them as if they were a Collection of Blockheads, Knaves, and Beggars, without one Man of Sense, Virtue, or Estate, among them.

Gentleman.

I will not talk so of their Adversaries; but I will engage to make good what I have here asserted of *Them*; and can truly assure you, that I know very few who are not in the Administration, or Friends to it, whom it would be any great Gain to the Nation, to have employ'd in any Offices of Power or Trust.

Alderman.

But all this while you forget our Taxes; and unless we could forget them too, we shall not very easily be brought to think well of those who have laid them upon us.

Gentleman.

I would not have you think well of those who have laid them upon you; for they are the *Spaniards*, the *French*, and the *Jacobites*.

All the Administration have done hath been to consider how they might be raised with least

Incon-

Inconvenience and Hurt to the Public. And on that Account, I am sure, they stand in a very meritorious Light to the Nation. For the Taxes are neither unequally, or partially, laid; nor prejudicial to Trade and Manufactures, nor expensive in the Collection, nor productive of any new Influence, nor particularly hard on the Poor; which are the only Objections that can fairly be made against necessary Taxes. And that these were most necessary I have before sufficiently proved. In the borrowing of Money, I am sure, that the Minister at the Head of the Treasury hath more to boast of than perhaps any of his Predecessors. That after the Shock of so great a Blow as Public Credit received the Year before, and while the Nation was still so deeply engaged in the Midst of such Perils and Dangers, he should be able to raise so vast a Sum upon such easy and moderate Terms, is what none would have believed to be possible till convinced by the Fact; and what would not have been possible to *any Minister, who was not possessed, in the highest Degree, of the good Opinion and Confidence of Mankind.* This is a Triumph to one in his Station, as great and glorious as the most decisive Victory can be to a General. And what a noble and disinterested Spirit, what an amiable Candour did

did he shew, in coming so readily into the Scheme of a \* Gentleman who had the Year before opposed his ; and in lending him all the Weight of his Power and Interest to render it feasible, as soon as he judged that the Scale of public Affairs made it safe to venture upon such an Experiment. It is hard to say which deserves best of the Publick, he, or the worthy Gentleman whose Scheme he adopted. Both of them equally shewed, that their Minds were superior to all Party-jealousy, and actuated entirely by an honest Zeal for the Good of their Country ; but such a Conduct is still more rare in a Minister, there being too many Instances of Men in that Station rejecting and defeating Proposals, which they knew to be right, only because they were not proposed by themselves.

Alderman.

If what you tell me be true, all the Abuse thrown out upon that Gentleman, by some of my Friends, hath no Foundation at all.

Gentleman.

Pardon me ; you are now too hard on your Friends. The Foundation is great and

\* *Sir John Barnard.*

appa-

apparent. It is the eminent Merit he had in defeating the late Rebellion, by the early Advice that he gave to bring over our Troops, without which that Rebellion would certainly have proved successful; when some who oppose him, and would be thought good Friends to the Government, affected to treat our Danger with Scorn, and the Measure of recalling our Troops to the Defence of their Country, as the Effect of a cowardly and pusillanimous Spirit. Indeed, I make no doubt but Time will prove, that other Objections which have been made to his Conduct, by the same Gentlemen, have the same Foundation; and that his King and Country are greatly obliged to him for what hath been called Dullness, or Fear, by those who think wild and chimerical Enterprizes Proofs of superior Genius and Parts, or desperate Rashness and Folly, a Mark of Courage and Resolution.

Alderman.

Well, I must frankly own, either you have hitherto had a good Cause, or your Cause hath had a good Advocate.

Gentleman.

The very best Advocate a good Cause can have; which is plain-spoken Truth. But  
 L have



have you any more Grievances to complain of?

Alderman.

Grievances----Ay----let me see---Oh---Zounds! Why they say you have broken the Union.

Gentleman.

That is a thundering Grievance indeed. But hark you, Friend, I hope your Allies, the *Jacobites*, do not complain of that as a Grievance, which was the first Act of their young Master's Regency, and his principal Merit to *Scotland*?

Alderman.

Look you, Sir, we have Wit enough to make it a Charge in some Parts of the Kingdom, against the present Government, that there is a Union between *England* and *Scotland*, and in others, that the Union is broken. But to be serious: Doth not the late Bill for abolishing Heretable Jurisdictions in *Scotland* infringe the Union?

Gentleman.

How, pray?

Alderman.

Why, are not those Jurisdictions declared by the Union to be Rights of Property, and  
not

not to be alter'd, unless for the evident Utility of the Subject in *Scotland*? \*

Gentleman.

Yes; and therefore, as Rights of Property, they are not taken away without a Compensation made to the Owners, which is the Method used to reconcile private Justice with public Good in many Cases of a similar Nature, such as the Building of Bridges, making of Fortifications, and all other Acts where the Rights of Particulars are taken away for the Benefit of the Public.

Alderman.

But it will be necessary to shew the Utility of taking away these Jurisdictions before you will be clear of a Breach of the Union, upon this Principle, which I allow to be good.

Gentleman.

If the diffusing the Justice of the Crown over all Parts of the Kingdom, be for the Good of the Kingdom in general; if the Freeing the Subject from any Oppression

\* See the 18th and 20th Articles of the Treaty of Union.

and servile Dependence upon his Fellow-Subject ; if the removing all Interruption between him and the Fountain of Justice, the Crown ; if the putting him, as the *English* Freeholder is, under the sole Protection of the King, and the Law ; if all this, I say, be for the Benefit of the Subject in *Scotland*, then the Utility of taking away these Jurisdictions, is undeniably evident, and of a much higher Nature than in the Cases I mentioned before. Indeed such is the Utility of this Alteration ; so much doth it concern the Publick Policy, and Common Weal of this Kingdom ; that had not these Jurisdictions been expressly declared by the Treaty of Union to be private Rights, they might have been taken away without Compensation, as detrimental and dangerous to the State, or barely to bring the Course and Order of Government there to a nearer Conformity with that of *England* ; which by the 18th Article is declared to be Reason sufficient for altering the Laws that concern Public Right, Policy, and Civil Government. But surely to say that these Jurisdictions cannot be resumed, even upon due Satisfaction made to the Owners, is to suppose that they alone, of all Mankind, at least in civilized Countries, are exempted from the first Law

Law of all Society, and from the great Maxim upon which all Government rests, that Private Conveniency shall give way to public Good.

Alderman.

Are not the Nobility of any Kingdom the great Guardians of Liberty; and the Powers enjoyed by them the best Restraints on that of the Crown?

Gentleman.

- No; by no means. The Liberty of the People is much better guarded by their own Representatives and by the Power of Parliament, than by that of the Nobles, who are as apt and more apt to oppress them, and to abuse their Power, than the King to abuse His in a well-ballanced and well-ordered Constitution. *That is the freest Government* (to use the Words of a noble Scotch Duke in the Debate on this Bill) *in which most People are free.* Such is the Government here, and such by this Bill; and others past in this memorable Session of Parliament, will that of *Scotland* hereafter be.

Alderman.

- But if these Jurisdictions be in their Nature



ture so hurtful, as you suppose, how comes it about that they were not sooner taken away?

Gentleman.

Because all right Things in Government cannot be done at once; especially where particular Interests, and those of great and powerful Men, are concerned in preventing the Reformation; and because to effect such a Reformation, many things must concur which do not often fall out together: a great Occasion to awaken the Attention of the Legislature, great Authority in the Government, great Spirit, Great Prudence, great Temper in the Administration, and above all, a stronger Regard to the preventing of future Evils than to the enjoying present Quiet and Ease, and to the patching up Matters for their own Times, a Virtue most rare in a Ministry.

Alderman.

But after all, was it wise in the Government to offend the *Scotch* at this time?

Gentleman.

Who told you they will be offended? On the contrary, I am persuaded that when they are rightly informed of the true Nature

ture and Intent of these Bills; when they see how strongly they erred who had represented them as any Reflection or Punishment upon their Nation; that on the contrary, they are given to them as national Benefits, and happy Fruits of the Union; I am persuaded, I say, that they will receive them with Satisfaction and Gratitude, and that the King and his Administration will be more popular there on this Account. Well, do your Friends complain of any thing more?

Alderman.

Complain! ay, believe me, do they, and loudly too, of this Diffolution of the Parliament.

Gentleman.

What, the same Men who are so angry at Parliaments continuing so long? But is it the Power of the Crown they dispute, or the Expediency of the Measure?

Alderman.

As to the Power, there can be no Question, for there are many Precedents of such Diffolutions.

Gentleman.

Gentleman.

Pardon me there ; not of *such* Dissolutions. Many of our Kings have in Anger dissolved their Parliaments, often without any Intent of calling another for a considerable Period of Time, because these would not come into Court Measures, or give up some Points of their own, which the Court disapproved ; and such Dissolutions, I grant you, were dangerous Things, and just Grounds of Complaint. But for a King to dissolve a Parliament, which hath distinguished itself by eminent Zeal for his Service, and with which he hath never once disagreed ; to abridge their Duration, and yet dismiss them with Praises and Thanks, of this no Precedent is to be found in our Annals.

Alderman.

What then is the Reason of so new a Proceeding ?

Gentleman.

The Reason is this : It is necessary at this time, that as well our Allies as our foreign Enemies should know the real Stability of the present Government, and that our King reigns in the Hearts of his People, contrary to the malicious Suggestions of *Jacobites*,  
both

both at home and abroad. These have wickedly given out; that not only the present Administration, but even the present Royal Establishment subsists only by a corrupt accidental Majority; in a Parliament almost expired; and that the People, when they should have it again in their Power, would chuse such Representatives as will subvert them both. Hence our foreign Friends are more timorous and jealous, and our Enemies more stubborn. To defeat these Misapprehensions in so dangerous a Season; his Majesty hath thought proper to appeal a Year earlier to the Voice of his People; depending on that Love and Fidelity of theirs, which he so eminently deserves; and well assured they will shew the World, that this Nation is not so mad or infatuated as some at home have wickedly represented it, or some abroad have foolishly believed it. But I will add no more on this Topic. Read the King's Speech.

Alderman.

I have, and must own it speaks a Language worthy of a King of *Great Britain*.

Gentleman.

How noble a Confidence doth his Majesty express in the Hearts of his People. Pray

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contrast this Dissolution with the Prolongation of Parliament beyond the Time for which it was chosen, which was so much complained of in the late Reign. The only Reason assigned for that Prolongation, and indeed the only one that could excuse it in any Manner, was the danger of going to the Election of a new Parliament, the Year after a Rebellion, though we were then in Peace with all the World. A second Rebellion, and a more dangerous one still than the former, is but just overcome; we are in War with *France* and *Spain*; yet instead of prolonging this Parliament beyond its due Term upon that Account, his Majesty hath thought fit to shorten the Term of it by a whole Year. So much more confidently doth he trust in the Loyalty and Affections of his People, than his Father's Administration imagined it safe for that Prince to do. The Reason is plain; the Royal Family then were new to the Nation, but now they are known to us; we have experienced their just and beneficent Government; and that Experience hath rooted in us a Love for the present Establishment, which no Arts of Sedition or Faction can be able to shake. At the same time I will venture to say, this Act of Confidence will yet more strongly establish his Majesty in the  
Hearts

Hearts of his People; for it is natural to them to love the more, the more they are trusted.

Alderman.

They say, it is done because there is some very bad Measures now on the Tapis, which this Dissolution foretels.

Gentleman.

The Presumption is strong the other way. Since, if there were any such Measures in View, they never would venture to trust them to the Judgment of a new Parliament, instead of one in which they have had so clear a Majority.

Alderman.

But is not this stealing a Parliament by Surprise?

Gentleman.

I know but one way of *stealing* a Parliament, which is by a great Number of false Returns. Now, to obtain them, the Sheriffs and returning Officers must be so made as to be fit for the Purpose. Is that the Case this present Year? Look all over the Kingdom, and you will find it quite otherwise, which is the strongest Presumption, that nothing

unfair is meant by the Court. And as to Surprize, did not all those who had a natural Interest in any County, City, or Corporation, begin making their Interest, before it was known that the Parliament would be dissolved, as is always done the Year before a general Election. Faction indeed will have less Time to work in, the People will sooner return to their Morals and Senses, and the Reign of Drunkenness, Idleness, and other Enormities attending Elections, will be abridg'd. Country Gentlemen will save the Expence of treating their Boroughs or Counties a Twelve-month more. What of all this, I desire to know, can afford a reasonable Cause of Complaint?

Alderman,

Well, well, you may talk as you please, but it is the Right of the People of *England* to be discontented, and the Discontented have a Right to complain.

Gentleman.

The People of *England* in general are by no means discontented. Some Discontents there will always be, and I will tell you the Causes to which I ascribe those that subsist at present among us. First, to that universal Luxury, which hath flow'd in like a Deluge upon

upon the whole Nation, and is really the Cause as well of that Corruption of which you complain, as of that of which I have complained ; For while every Man lives above his Degree, and runs into Expences beyond his Income, Wants and Distresses are every where generated in private Life ; and when Men are uneasy there, they will not be easily pleased with the Public. The Tradesman finds his usual Profit unequal to the increase of his Expence, and complains of the Decay of Trade. The Farmer is racked by his necessitous Landlord, who instead of circulating his Cash back among his Tenants, drains all off either to the Capital, or to some other Place of public Resort and Pleasure, where the greatest Part is spent in foreign Luxury ; hence the impoverish'd Country complains of the Weight of Taxes ; which, tho' at best they would be burthensome, become thus intolerable. And, lastly, the Gentleman himself, having by such Means run out his Fortune, thinks of retrieving his Necessities by a Place ; hence Murmurs against the Administration, which cannot supply the real Wants, or fancied Merits, of all Mankind. To these, if we add the Calamities and Load of Expence brought on us by the Ambition and Malice of our foreign and domestic Foes, we shall find the true Source of all our  
real



real Misfortunes, as well as of those chimerical Grievances, to redress which we are to extirpate at once both our Liberties and our Religion, by exchanging the best of Kings; a King respected all over *Europe*, whom, if the whole People personally knew, they would all personally love; for a tyrannical Papist to be introduced here by the Cabals of *Rome*, and by the Arms of *France*, and who hath dared to affect absolute Power even in his Declaration. In his political Principles an Enemy to our Liberties; in his Faith, to our Religion; and in his Heart incensed against all our People, except a few desperate Rebels; dissolving the Union, and then mounting the Throne, under the highest Obligations to *France*, and to the worst Part of *Scotland*.

Alderman.

This is a frightful Picture indeed. I promise you his Friends represent him in a different Manner to our Party.

Gentleman.

And can you, or any Men in the Nation who call themselves Whigs, be the Tools and Bubbles of such despicable Wretches? For do not deceive yourselves; you are doing their Business, and not they yours. The Republican doth indeed serve the Purpose of the

*Jacobite*, as the Atheist doth that of the Papist : For to reduce this Nation to the Form of a Republic, is as wild a Scheme as to reduce it to Atheism ; and thus, while the one assists in undermining our Government, and the other in undermining our Religion, the Schemes of Slavery and of Popery are in Fact carried on.

Alderman.

Yet surely you state the Case too strongly ; the introducing Popery is not the necessary Consequence of introducing a popish Prince.

Gentleman.

Surely it is. No one Event can be more necessarily the Consequence of another. If you think this wants any Proof, let me recommend the Pamphlets to you writ at the Time of the late Rebellion, and you will there find this Point fully demonstrated. But admit the Danger to be never so small, why should we incur it ? If we have no Grievances, we want no Exchange. If we have some, yet unless they were of the highest Nature, they can never justify either the Honesty of an Exchange, by which we must become perjured Traitors, or the Wisdom of it, since we must most certainly run the greatest  
Risque

Risque of both our Religion and our Liberties.

Alderman.

It would be a great Risque indeed ; and I am not ashamed to own you have convinced me, it would be both dishonest and foolish in us to venture it.

Gentleman.

Give me your Vote then for those honest Gentlemen, who will support an Administration which hath already preserved this Nation from Ruin, and under which the present Establishment, and of Consequence our Religion and Liberties, will be always secure.

Alderman.

As to my Vote, I told you, it was engaged.

Gentleman.

Engagements into which you have been deceitfully drawn under false Colours and Pretences, cannot be binding. Will you vote for Men who have endeavoured to inflame you with a Cry of Grievances, which you now see to be wholly Chimerical ? And what are these Men ? One of them a notorious *Jacobite*, and as notorious a Blockhead.

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The other a Person of known profligate Principles; a *Whig* in Name, but in Heart a Slave as all wicked Men are; one who hath joined with this *Jacobite*, and would join with the Devil himself, to work himself into Employment, which he despairs of being let into under the present Administration.

Alderman.

My dear Friend, can I be safely free with you?

Gentleman.

You have already shewn that you think so.

Alderman.

Why then ---- I am almost ashamed to own it; but, O my Friend, mutual Promises have past between us. I have promised my Vote, and Mr. *Toastum* hath promised whenever his Party comes into Power to provide for my Son.

Gentleman.

As to the Conscientious Part, I think I have convinced you on which Side it lies; and as to the interested, I believe, I need very few Arguments to satisfy you, that my Friends

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are



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are more likely to have it in their Power to serve your Son.

Alderman.

Let them do as they will, you have convinced me, that I cannot keep my Promise, and preserve my Duty to my Country. Here's a Health to our noble Sovereign King GEORGE; and I assure you no Enemy of his, or of my Country, shall ever have a Vote of mine.

Gentleman.

Fill a Bumper, my Friend, and I would pledge you, was the Glas ever so big. Believe me, it is under him and his Family only that our Religion, Liberties and Properties can be secure; and under him it must be our own Faults, if we are not a happy and flourishing People.

Alderman.

I really believe it.

Gentleman.

You see plainly now, the Views of your two Candidates; the one would destroy the Administration at the Hazard of the Government, to introduce himself into Power; and the other would destroy the Government, to introduce

duce the *Pretender*. One or other of these Schemes is the real Motive of all the present Opposition, except among those who are merely the Dupes and Fools of the others. The two first Sorts of People know what they mean, and mean very ill; the latter would perhaps mean well enough, if they had but Sense to know *what they mean*. The first I detest; I pity the last; but both the Knaves and the Fools must be withstood and defeated at this critical Time, or between them the Nation will be undone. For my own Part, I have no Doubt but they will be defeated. And if we have a good Parliament, and can but see quiet Times, I make no Question but whatever is really amiss in the Government will be reformed, and that the Ministry will heartily join in the Work. But let us think of Safety before Reformation. And when we do reform, let it be soberly and temperately done; not according to the impracticable Schemes of School-boy Politicians, or the furious Passions of Party Zealots; but with Knowledge, Judgment, and Impartiality; always remembering, *that we want good Examples more than good Laws*.

## F I N I S.

ERRATA. Page 32, line 2. for *popular* read *unpopular*.  
 Pag. 33. line first, for *these two* read *Pensioners too*.